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The Worship Test: Balancing the Religion
Clauses in the Limited Public Forum
By

JOSHUA

B.

MARKER*

American legal history is replete with controversies regarding
conflict between the religion clauses of the First Amendment.' In the
limited public forum, however, jurisprudence regarding the conflict
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is quite
recent, and its full implications are not yet fully developed. The Court
most recently dealt with the issue in Good News Club v. Milford! While
Good News Club answered some questions, the circuits quickly noted
that some key questions were left unaddressed.
We pause, however, to note some unresolved issues that arise from
the recent Supreme Court precedent that, as an appellate court, we are
bound to follow. Would we be able to identify a form of religious
worship that is divorced from the teaching of moral values? Should we
continue to evaluate activities on a case-by-case basis, or should
worship no longer be treated as a distinct category of speech? How
does the distinction drawn in our earlier precedent between worship
and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint relate to the
dichotomy suggested in Good News Club between "mere" worship on
the one hand and worship that is not divorced from the teaching of
moral values on the other?
Further.... [i]n all of this process, is there not a danger of excessive
entanglement by the state in religion?3
In other words, in the limited public forum, three major unaddressed
issues confront the courts with regard to religion, and more specifically,
worship. The first issue is whether or not a restriction on worship in a
viewpoint
unconstitutional
constitutes
public
forum
limited

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009. I would like to
thank Professor Calvin Massey for his advice, criticism, and thought-provoking questions.
i. U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing both the separation of church and state, and the freedom
of religion).
2. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
3. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Nelson
Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (2008) ("Perhaps the closest question today
is whether the government is required to allow worship itself to take place on public premises
whenever it opens them to speech by civic organizations.").
[673]
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discrimination. Second, assuming that it is not viewpoint discrimination,
do the courts have the authority to distinguish between religious worship
and other manners of religious speech? Lastly, if the courts can indeed
distinguish between religious worship and religious speech, what is the
appropriate test for making that distinction?
Part I of this Note will look at the differing interpretations of Good
News Club in the circuits and argue that distinguishing between religious
worship and religious speech is not viewpoint discrimination. Part II will
argue that, in the context of the limited public forum, it is within the
power of the Court to make a distinction between worship and other
manners of religious speech. In Part III, this Note will propose a test to
distinguish between religious speech and worship.
In no way does this Note argue that a limited public forum must
restrict worship. This Note expresses no animus towards religion. It
argues solely that if a limited public forum chooses to restrict worship,
that restriction is valid, and that in order to make this valid restriction
enforceable, the Court needs a basis upon which to distinguish worship
from other manners of religious speech.
I. A RESTRICTION ON RELIGIOUS WORSHIP IS VIEWPOINT NEUTRAL
The government creates a limited public forum "only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." 4 The
limited public forum is not a true public forum which is "open for
indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes."5 Restrictions on
speech are permissible so long as they are reasonable and do not
discriminate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint. 6 The restriction
"need only be reasonable [given the purpose of the forum]; it need not
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable [restriction]." 7 As with
other areas of free speech jurisprudence, restrictions on time, place, and
manner of speech are permissible.8
The Court examined restrictions on religious speech in the limited
public forum in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District.9 A
school opened its doors to the public for "social, civic or recreational
uses" but the school expressly prohibited use "by any group for religious
purposes."'" The school denied petitioner's application to use the
4. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
5. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,392 (1993).
6. Cornelius, 473 U.S at 8o6.
7. Id. at 8o8.
8. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. 798 (1989) ("[A] regulation of the time,
place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate.
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing
so.").

9. 508 U.S. at 386.
to. Id. at 387.
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premises to show a series of videos on family values and child rearing
from the religious perspective." The Court found that this was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination." The subject matter of child
rearing and family values certainly fell within the purpose of the forum.
The school, therefore, could not prohibit the video series, which merely
expressed a religious viewpoint on a permissible subject matter." This is
the heart of the law regarding restrictions on religious speech in the
limited public forum. A speaker must be allowed to express a religious
viewpoint on an otherwise permissible subject matter if he or she wishes
to do so. To entirely forbid the religious perspective constitutes
viewpoint discrimination.
The Court refined the analysis of religious viewpoint discrimination
in the limited public forum in Good News Club v. Milford.'4 As in
Lamb's Chapel, a school district prohibited the use of school facilities for
religious purposes.'5 Even though the religious group ostensibly used the
premises for general religious instruction, the Court held that the denial
of the group's application to use the forum amounted to unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination. Despite the lack of a specific subject matter
for their meetings, the Court held that given the permissible purposes for
which other groups used the premises, the general "teaching [of] morals
and character development to children is a permissible purpose... [and]
it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character development to
children."'
However, it is not the holding of this case, but the dicta that is a
source of controversy, and which is relevant to the issue here. In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia writes that the Court has rejected attempts to
distinguish between speech and worship and that there is no intelligible
distinction between them.' 8 It is this issue-whether such a distinction
exists-that has been the cause of much confusion for the circuit courts.
This confusion is best explained through the lens of a series of cases in
the Second Circuit.
Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 393-94.
13. Id.
14. 533 U.S. 98,102 (2001).
15. Id. at io3.
16. Id. at io7.
17. Id. at io8. The policy allowed someone to teach morals through the use of Aesop's Fables.
Similarly, the Boy Scouts would be allowed to teach character development. The Court held that
Good News Club was similar because it taught "children to overcome feelings of jealousy, to treat
others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if it does so in
nonsecular way." Id.
18. In his dissent, Justice Souter states that he views the activities in question as closer to religious
worship than just nonsecular character development. Id. at 139 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). In response
to this point, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, stated that he did not think that the distinction between
worship and speech had "intelligible content." Id. at 126 (Scalia, J., concurring).
ii.

12.
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The Bronx Household of Faith series of cases'9 illustrate the trouble
that the circuits have had in balancing the religion clauses without a
workable method for the differentiation between worship and other
forms of religious speech. Prior to Good News Club, the Second Circuit
held in Bronx I that a school board restriction which allowed for religious
speech, but prohibited religious instruction and worship, was viewpoint
neutral and constitutional."
After Good News Club, however, the Second Circuit heard Bronx II,
which was the same issue, between the same parties.' Despite the denial
of certiorari in Bronx I, in Bronx II, a divided Second Circuit reversed
itself and held that the denial of a church group's application to use the
premises on a Sunday morning was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination.22 Despite the presence of elements of worship, the
activities in question were not "'mere religious worship, divorced from
any teaching of moral values.' 23 Because other similarly situated groups
were allowed to use the premises for the teaching of morals and
character development, so could the Bronx Household of Faith. This
interpretation of Good News Club, which mirrors Scalia's concurrence,
was also applied by the Third and Fourth Circuits. 4
However, not all of the circuits agreed with the majority
interpretation in Bronx II. In Faith Center Church v. Glover, the Ninth
Circuit did not find unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when the
Antioch Library barred Faith Center Church from using the library
meeting rooms as a house of worship.25 The library opened up its meeting
rooms for educational, social, and community purposes." Religious
services, however, were prohibited in the meeting rooms.27 Faith Center
Church wished to use a room for distinct morning and afternoon
sessions. 8 The morning session dealt with communication, including
Bible discussions, teaching, prayer, and discussion of social issues; the

i9. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx 1), 127 F.3 d 207 (2d Cir. 1997); Bronx
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx II), 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003); Bronx Household of Faith
v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx II), 492 F. 3 d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
20. 127 F.3d at 215.
21. 331 F.3d at 346.
22.

Id. at 354.

23. Id.
24. Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 525 (3d Cir.

2004); Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 594 (4th
Cir. 2004).
25. 462 F.3d 1194, 1214 (9th Cir. 2006).
26. Id. at 1198.
27. Id. When the case was first filed, the restriction prohibited both religious services and
activities. Id. at i i99. However, prior to the appeal, the library changed the restriction to its current

form. Id.
28. Id. at

199.
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afternoon session was reserved for "praise and worship."2 9 The library
only restricted the afternoon worship session.3" The morning session,
which consisted of other manners of religious speech, was acceptable.'
The court held that by merely restricting worship, the library did not
discriminate based upon viewpoint.32 The library policy allowed for the
expression of the religious viewpoint, which is all that the Constitution
requires in the limited public forum. Critically, the court also held that, in
this case at least, religious worship could be distinguished from other
religious speech, as the church itself had explicitly made this very
distinction.33 Even if the church had not done so, the majority also noted
"that the government is capable of identifying proselytizing religious
speech or speech that simply has aspects of religious worship."34
To add to the difficulties created by Good News Club, the
differences in interpretation did not remain limited to conflict between
the circuits. After Faith Center Church, the Second Circuit again joined
the fray in Bronx III. Judge Calabresi, in his Bronx III concurrence,
seems to follow the precedent of the Ninth Circuit in Faith Center
Church, rather than that of Bronx H."
While the substantive law regarding the limited public forum had
not changed since the Second Circuit decided Bronx II, a significant
change in the restriction had been put in place. No longer did the school
prohibit both religious instruction and worship; now, only religious
worship was prohibited. While religious speech and instruction were now
permissible, a religious group still could not use the school as a house of
worship. 36 Judge Calabresi concluded that the activities in question were
indeed worship, and easily distinguishable from a Bible study class.37 As
the revised restriction was only on worship, and Judge Calabresi found
that the activities in question were worship, he had no problem
concluding that the school district's restriction did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination." The restriction allowed for ample opportunity
to express the religious viewpoint, just not through a worship service.

Id. at 1210.
30. See id. at 1214.
29.

31. Id. at i2io. Antioch County acknowledged that under the new policy, which only restricted
worship, the morning session was permissible. Id. at 1200. It was not permissible under the original
policy, which was broader. Id.
32. Id. at 1214.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 1213 n.17.
35. Bronx Il, 492 F.3d 89. 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring). The overwhelming
majority of this opinion is dicta: the court only reached a majority on the issue of whether to vacate the
injunction. Id. at io6.
36. Id. at 94.
37. Id. at 103.
38. Id. at i06.
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There are two preliminary issues left open by these decisions which
must be addressed before dealing with the larger issue of the viewpoint
neutrality of a restriction on worship. First, are Faith Center Church and
the concurrence in Bronx III in direct conflict with Good News Club?
Second, is there any way to reconcile the different interpretations both
among the circuits, and within the Second Circuit?
The first issue is whether decisions such as Faith Center Church,
which hold that worship can be distinguished from religious speech, still
lie within the bounds of Good News Club. While Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Good News Club argues that no distinction exists
between worship and speech, it is clear that the majority does not concur.
In fact, the holding actually acknowledges that worship can be
distinguished from speech. The majority held "that the Club's activities
do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of
moral values."39 In other words, the activities dealt with an otherwise

permissible subject matter-the teaching of moral values-but merely
incorporated elements of worship in order to do so. The implication is
that an activity can be "mere worship," separate from the teaching of
moral values.
As to the issue of reconciling the differing interpretations, it might
be that the circuits are actually closer to agreeing than splitting on a
Good News Club interpretation. In Bronx II, the Second Circuit echoed
the language of Good News Club and held that the meetings of the
Bronx Household of Faith were not "only religious worship, separate
and apart from any teaching of moral values."4 In fact, on the surface,
the activities in question in Bronx II were much more analogous to the
morning activities in Faith Center Church, as opposed to the "praise and
worship" activities of the afternoon. In Bronx II, the church group
meetings consisted of Bible teaching, singing, prayer, and social
fellowship.' Much like the morning activities in Faith Center Church and
the activities in Good News Club, the Bronx II activities included
teaching, supplemented with elements of worship.42
In this regard, both interpretations agree with the portion of Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Good News Club, in which he argues that the
presence of elements of worship are in fact necessary in order for a
religious group to be on equal grounds with a secular group.43 In order to
fully explain the religious viewpoint on an otherwise permissible subject
matter, the speaker must be allowed to refer to the Bible, prayers, or

39. Good News Club v. Milford, 533 U.S.

102, 112 n.4 (2001).

40. 331 F.3 d 342,354 (2d Cir. 2003).
41. Id. at 347.
42. Id. at 354.
43. 533 U.S. at 125-26 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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hymns. The cases differ significantly not in their interpretations, but in
their facts. Faith Center Church simply involved a religious group, which
explicitly stated that an entire portion of their meeting was devoted to
praise and worship, 4' as opposed to merely incorporating elements of
worship in order to support their viewpoint.
Beyond this difference in facts, the difference in the wording of the
restriction is critical.45 With a greater focus on the breadth of the
restriction, it is easier to reconcile the differences among the circuits and
even to explain the seeming contradiction between Bronx II and the
concurrence in Bronx III. There is, however, a threshold issue that must
be addressed: is this restriction on religious worship truly viewpoint
neutral, or is the distinction that the circuit courts have found implied in
Good News Club untenable?
A more in-depth look at worship will show that this restriction on
religious worship is nothing more than a manner restriction, which is
viewpoint neutral. For purposes of the limited public forum, worship can
be analyzed in two ways: as a uniquely religious category of speech, or as
a category of speech that has a secular equivalent. It does not matter
which analysis is preferred; either will lead to the same conclusion-that
the restriction does not discriminate against the religious viewpoint. It is
simply a restriction on the manner of expressing the religious viewpoint,
and restrictions on manner are constitutional. 46
If worship is a category of speech that is unique to religion, the
argument that the exclusion of worship is viewpoint discrimination is
logically unsound. Rather, the exclusion is a restriction on the manner of
expressing the religious viewpoint. "The ... ban certainly has the effect
of limiting one particular means of expressing the kind of... message
being disseminated .... But simply to define what is being banned as the
'message' is to assume the conclusion."47 Even with a ban on worship,
there are numerous alternate methods for communication of the
religious message. The religious message is conveyed in a variety of
manners-from video series on family rearing, to Bible study, to the
numerous other permissible manners of speech available to the secular
groups. Because it is still possible to express the religious viewpoint in a

44. 462 F.3d 1194, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006).
45. See discussion infra Part III.
46. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
47. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292-93 (2000). The City of Erie had placed a total
ban on public nudity, effectively prohibiting fully nude strip clubs. Id. at 282. The Court held that this
was just a manner restriction on the erotic message. Id. at 295. As dancers could still perform if they
wore a g-string and pasties, the erotic message could still be conveyed in other manners. Id. Hence, it
was not a First Amendment violation. See id. at 302; see also Tebbe, supra note 3, at 1309 ("If worship
were deemed to constitute a singular form of expression, then it might well be excludable from
government programs that support other speech by community groups.").
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forum which restricts worship, it is disingenuous to claim that the
restriction discriminates based on viewpoint.
Alternatively, worship can be seen as a category of speech that has
both religious and secular equivalents. This interpretation also does not
lend itself to a strong claim of viewpoint discrimination. Under this
analysis, if worship is restricted, then it affects the religious and the
secular viewpoints equally. The argument that the religious viewpoint
suffers from discrimination when the secular viewpoint is treated in the
same manner is not persuasive. Again, the restriction is just a limitation
upon the manner in which a viewpoint may be expressed; it is not a
limitation on the viewpoint itself.
In the limited public forum, restrictions on speech must not only be
viewpoint neutral, but must also be reasonable in light of the purpose of
the forum. 48 A restriction on worship would not have a problem passing
this reasonableness test. It is consistent with other restrictions that were
upheld in limited public forum cases. In Goulart v. Meadows, the Fourth
Circuit upheld Calvert County's restriction on "the use of its community
centers for private educational instruction intended to meet state
educational requirements." 9 This restriction effectively prevented
homeschoolers from using the community centers as a classroom."0 The
private instruction itself was held to be protected First Amendment
speech," just like worship. The community centers, however, were
limited public fora, and the court found that the restrictions were both
viewpoint neutral, and that restricting the forum from use as a de facto
classroom was reasonable. 3
Similarly, in Cogswell v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit looked at a
restriction on the manners of speech allowed in a voters' pamphlet
distributed by the city. 4 Seattle prohibited the "references to political
opponents in candidate statements included in the ... voters'
pamphlets."5 Even though it limited the manner in which candidates
could express their views, this restriction was also upheld as both
reasonable and viewpoint neutral because it merely restricted subject
matter. 6 Just as a restriction on worship is a restriction on the manner in
which a religious group may express itself, the restriction involved here
could also be considered a restriction on the manner in which candidates

48. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,806 (1985).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

345 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 247.
Id.
See id. at 255.

54. 347 F-3 d 8o9, 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 86.
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could express themselves and their viewpoints: they could share their
own plans and ideas, but could not attack the record of their opponent. 7
II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A restriction solely on worship is viewpoint neutral and reasonable
in a limited public forum. There is also an intelligible distinction between
worship and other manners of religious speech. The next issue that needs
to be addressed is justiciability. Whether or not courts have the power to
distinguish between worship and other manners of religious speech in the
limited public forum is a major unanswered issue in free speech
jurisprudence. An examination of other forays by the Supreme Court
into issues of religion demonstrates that this distinction is indeed
justiciable.

A.

AN INTELLIGIBLE DISTINCTION

The idea that the religious worship/religious speech distinction is
nonjusticiable has its roots in Widmar v. Vincent.*8 In Good News Club,
Justice Scalia relies on language in Widmar to claim that there is no
intelligible distinction between worship and speech. 9 A closer
examination, however, will show that Widmar is easily distinguishable
from the limited public forum cases. The language of the holding in
Widmar makes it clear that the Court was not addressing whether or 6not
worship was substantively distinguishable from other religious speech. ,
A significant difference between Widmar and the Good News Club
line of cases is the standard of forum analysis applied by the Court. In
Widmar, the forum in question was a university facility, generally open to
registered student groups. 6' Based upon current law, it is arguable that
the university facility was a limited public forum. The Court, however,
analyzed the case under something closer to a public forum standard. 26
The Court stated that "[i]n order to justify.. . exclusion from a
public forum ... the University must ....show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. ''6' Not only does the Court explicitly refer to
the facility as a public forum, 64 the standard applied is far stricter than the
standard in a limited public forum, in which the regulation need only be
57. Id. at 811-12.
58. 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (i98I).

59. 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 296 n.6).
60. 454 U.S. at 276-77.
61. Id. at 264-65.
62. Widmar was decided prior to Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (983), and prior to Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985), which are the bases for the current law regarding the limited public forum.
63. Widmar,454 U.S. at 269-70.
64. Id.
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viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.65
In the limited public forum, there is no need for a compelling state
interest, nor does the regulation need to be narrowly drawn, it only must
be viewpoint neutral. This difference is critical: it is much easier to
restrict speech in a limited public forum.
The language in Widmar that hints at nonjusticiability is merely
dicta, and it was not in response to the questions at issue here. Scalia's
reliance on it is misplaced. The dissent argued that worship is not
protected by the First Amendment•6 In reply, Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, stated that for the purpose of First Amendment
protections, there is no distinction between worship and other manners
of religious speech. 6' Thus, the language in Widmar upon which Scalia
relies only says that in terms of First Amendment protections, there is no
distinction between worship and speech; they are both protected forms
of speech. Widmar does not stand for the principal that there is no
practical distinction between worship and religious speech. By explicitly
stating that worship is protected, just like other speech, it implies that for
practical, rather than First Amendment purposes, there is a distinction.
In Faith Center Church the majority opinion agrees with the dicta in
Widmar that worship is protected speech under the First Amendment.6"
Whether or not worship is protected is not at issue in the limited public
forum cases. Worship is explicitly protected by the First Amendment. It
is possible, however, to restrict protected speech in a limited public
forum as long as the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.6 At
issue is whether or not the civil court system is capable of enforcing a
valid restriction on religious worship.
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence further erodes the argument
that there is no intelligible distinction between worship and other
manners of religious speech. After Good News Club, the Court upheld a
religious distinction akin to the worship/speech distinction in Locke v.
Davey." The state of Washington offered scholarships to students for
undergraduate study.' One stipulation for receipt of the scholarship was
at issue: a student could not use it to major in devotional theology. 2 A
student could major in religion generally, or take classes in devotional
theology,73 but the state chose not to fund the study of the inherently
65. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 8o6.
66. 454 U.S. at 283-84 (White, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 269 n.6 (majority opinion).
68. Faith Ctr. Church v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2006).
69. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3 d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2003). Even though the private instruction
was protected speech, reasonable restrictions on it were upheld. Id. at 256.
70. See 540 U.S. 712,715 (2004).

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 725.
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religious activity of devotional theology.74 The Court upheld the
restriction and said it did not violate the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment.75 The restriction did not place any new obstacle to religious
conduct or belief, students were still free to study for the ministry, just
not at the state's expense.
The distinction articulated by the Washington scholarship program
and upheld by the Court is directly and specifically applicable to the
worship/speech distinction. The program only restricted the major of
devotional theology. A major in religion or single classes in devotional
theology were not restricted. This is the exact distinction that the Court is
not sure it can make in the limited public forum. Worship can be seen as
the equivalent of majoring in devotional theology. Worship is the act of
expressing one's devotion to one's God. 76 Both relate to the actual
practice of religion. Other manners of religious speech can be equated to
majoring in religion-both are ways to teach or learn about religion, but
not practice it. Lastly, when elements of worship are incorporated into
permissible religious speech, that is akin to taking a class in devotional
theology, while having a different major. The Court had no problem
distinguishing the study of devotional theology from the study of religion
generally. The Court should therefore have no problem distinguishing
devotional religious speech (worship) from other manners of religious
speech.
Due to the nature of the limited public forum, the worship issue can
be analyzed under the funding framework of Locke. The scholarship
program was upheld because it reflected a decision by the state to
publicly fund education on some topics, but not others. 7 Similarly, a
closed forum becomes a limited public forum when the state chooses to
open it for a limited subject matter."s One could argue that this is really
the state's decision to fund discussion on a given topic by providing a
forum. Should a state choose to restrict worship in that limited public
forum, it is merely a reflection of a decision to fund discussion of some
topics, but not the topic of worship.
B.

THE CHURCH PROPERTY CASES

In the church property cases79 the Supreme Court laid out a fairly
detailed standard for the examination of controversies involving religion.
The Court set out standards for when civil courts may or may not review
controversies that touch upon religion, and this standard is applicable to
74. Id. at 715.

75. Id.
76. MERRIAM-WEBSTER

S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1445 (I

Ith ed.

2005).

77. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.

78. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (985).
79. See cases cited infra notes 80, 98.
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the issue of distinguishing between religious worship and speech. An
examination of these cases will show that the Court delved far deeper
into intrachurch controversies, as opposed to the controversy here, which
generally involves a municipality and a religious organization.
In Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church the Supreme Court
adjudicated a dispute between two formerly united congregations that
involved doctrinal religious analysis."' At issue was which congregation
was the rightful owner of church property when a local church decided to
split from the national church organization.8' The Court was concerned
with the potential for "inhibiting the free development of religious
doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern. ''82 The Court felt that it could not reach a decision
without having "to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those
doctrines to the religion."8 3 The Court did, however, give an indication of
when the civil courts can adjudicate a controversy involving religion: if it
could be decided using "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all
property disputes." 8'
The issues that concerned the Court in Presbyterian Church are not
present in the religious worship/religious speech determination. First,
the latter would not be an intrachurch dispute, but one between a
religious group and a municipality. Second, distinguishing between
religious worship and speech does not involve the interpretation of
church doctrine. The issue can be resolved using "neutral principles of
law," those developed for free speech disputes in limited public forum
cases. The religious group will have to fill out an application to use the
forum and, if it does not state so directly, a local official might have to
determine whether the activities described constitute a worship service.
This process does not, however, require any interpretation of church
doctrine.
In Bronx III, the pastor for the Bronx Household of Faith explained
that "significant differences separate the subject of worship services from
moral instruction given from a religious viewpoint: 'The Bible study club
would not administer the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper.
That would be a big difference.' '8 It would not be for a court to make
any one activity dispositive for a given religion's activity to be a worship
service; that would call for the interpretation of religious doctrine. There
are, however, significant differences between a worship service, and
80. 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969).
81. Id. at 44I.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. at 450.

84. Id. at 449.
85. Bronx 111, 492 F. 3 d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2007).
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discussing morals and character development from the religious
perspective.8 These differences are often easy to identify for the church
and civil courts alike.
The Court again examined the issue of justiciability of religious
matters when a bishop challenged his removal by the Serbian Orthodox
Church in the civil court system." The Bishop claimed that the church
did not follow its own internal regulations when it first suspended and
then removed him from office.8 8 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed and
held that the church's decision was arbitrary."' The Supreme Court
reversed and said that there is no arbitrariness exception that would
permit the Court to review church adjudications.' The Court did not
foreclose the possibility of reviewing future church decisions under "the
narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or 'collusion. ' '9. Specifically, an arbitrariness
analysis of a church's decision "inherently entail[s] inquiry into the
procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the
church judicatory to follow."92
The Court saw this as a "dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in
its character, - a matter over which the civil courts exercise no
jurisdiction,-a matter which concerns theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members
' To overturn
of the church to the standard of morals required of them."93
the church's adjudicatory body in a case such as this would require the
civil courts to inquire into "the whole subject of the doctrinal theology,
the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization
of every religious denomination.., with minuteness and care."'
Just as in Presbyterian Church, the concerns that the Court
expressed in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church are not germane to the
issue of a religious worship and religious speech distinction. Most
importantly, in the limited public forum, the worship/speech distinction
involves interpretation of municipal and constitutional law, matters over
which the civil court system plainly has jurisdiction. As noted above,
often the differences between a worship service and other religious
speech are obvious on their face.95 Furthermore, in order to guide the
distinction, a court would not have to inquire into "theological
86. See id.
87. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1976).
88. See id. at 698.
89. Id.
9o . Id. at 713.
9i. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 713-14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (I3 Wall.) 679, 733
(1871))94. Id. at 714.
492 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2007).
95. See Bronx 111,
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controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals
required of them." Finding a distinction between religious worship and
religious speech can be accomplished by inquiry into neutral sources,
such as their dictionary definitions."
The Court finally enumerated circumstances when it would be
constitutionally acceptable for the courts to adjudicate religious
controversy in Jones v. Wolf.9 The Court announced a number of
principles that are directly applicable to the question of a court's ability
to distinguish between worship and other manners of religious speech.
These principles show that the First Amendment does not prohibit a
court from distinguishing worship in the narrow category of the limited
public forum, despite the issue of religion.
As in Presbyterian Church, in Jones there was a dispute over the
proper owner of church property following a schism within a church."
The church in question, Vineville Presbyterian, was a member church of
the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). "° The PCUS
established a commission to resolve the dispute within Vineville. 1' 1 The
commission ruled that the minority faction was the true Vineville
congregation.' 2 That same minority faction then appealed to the courts
for declaratory and injunctive relief so as to enforce their right to
exclusive possession of the church property.'" Not only did the state
courts have no problem reviewing the church commission decision, the
courts actually reversed the church commission and held that the
majority faction was the proper owner of the church property in
question. "4
Unlike in PresbyterianChurch, the Georgia courts based this ruling
not on basic tenets of church doctrine, but on neutral principles of
property law, and this time the Supreme Court found the issue
justiciable, and endorsed the standard used by the Georgia Supreme

96. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (i3 Wall.) at 733-34) (emphasis
omitted).
97. Worship is defined by its reverence of a higher power. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY I445 (IIth ed. 2005). It is a service intended to, or the specific act of honoring a deity, or
something else worthy of such admiration. Id. Generically, speech is the expression of thoughts
through the spoken word. Id. at I 199. Religious speech is the expression of thoughts about religion or
based upon religion. It is not the explicit honoring of the deity in a given religion; it is the discussion
about that religion.
98. 443 U.S. 595. 603-°4 (I979).
99. Id. at 597.
I0.
Id.
iol. Id. at 598.
102. Id.
lo3. Id. at 598-99.
104. Id.
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Court. 5 Importantly, the neutral principles of law approach does not
entail avoiding religious issues altogether. Rather, it "requires a civil
court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church
constitution."'06 The state court reviewed provisions of the Book of
Church Order for any language of trust, to assist in the determination of
who was the proper owner of the church property in dispute."
This point is quite relevant for the issue of worship determination.
Based upon Jones, so long as a court reaches its decision using neutral
principles of law, it is acceptable for that court to look at religion, as well
as religious documents and activities, in reaching its decision. It would be
fine for a court to look at a specific religion's worship service, or to read
a religious document regarding aspects of a worship service. What is not
permissible is the interpretation of the basic tenets of religion, or the
determination of ecclesiastical questions. But, as is shown in Jones,
merely looking at aspects of religion on their face does not cross this
constitutional barrier.
There are additional principles in Jones that apply to the
worship/speech distinction. The Court explicitly stated that the First
Amendment does not require "the States to adopt a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority in resolving. .. disputes, even where no
issue of doctrinal controversy is involved."' The fact that a religious
group does not identify a given activity as worship on an application to
use a facility does not mean that the local official in charge cannot draw a
different conclusion. The local official does not have to defer to religious
authority because there is a First Amendment issue. Just as that local
official can inform other groups when their activities do not fall within
the purpose of the forum, so can that official tell a religious group.
Otherwise a religious group could simply avoid use of the "W" word,
regardless of the true nature of the activity, and this is exactly what
happened in Bronx 1M.'"
One final principle from Jones is applicable: when appropriate, it is
important for the Court to establish a test for deciding religious issues,
even though there "will be occasional problems in application.....
Although questions related to religious matters can be very difficult to
adjudicate, a court should not fail to assert its constitutional authority to

Id. at 6oi. The case was remanded on a separate issue. Id. at 6o9-io.
1o6. Id. at 604.
107. Id. at 6oi.
io8. Id. at 605.
109. 492 F.3 d 89, lot n.7. After initially calling their activities "worship," "in subsequent permit
applications, plaintiffs listed only the component activities of the Sunday meetings and did so in order
to avoid the term 'worship.' Pastor Hall stated: 'As a tactical move, we decided beforehand to avoid
using the dreaded 'W' word."'
iio. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604.
105.
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do so when appropriate. In fact, "the promise of nonentanglement and
neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than
compensates" for these occasional problems, which, "in addition, should
be gradually eliminated as recognition is given to the obligation of States,
religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships ... so
as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions ....
This last point is significant to the worship question. As with any
question about religion and the law, occasional difficulties will arise in
the application of a test, for worship or otherwise."' Furthermore, as is
illustrated by the Bronx Household of Faith series of cases," 3 without a
test, the circuits are having more than occasional difficulties. Should the
Supreme Court announce a test based upon the neutral principles of law
regarding speech restrictions in limited public fora, the test will allow
religious organizations and municipalities to better understand their
obligations. They will have a baseline from which to structure their
relationships, so as not to require regular intervention from the courts.
C.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Establishment Clause instructs that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.""..4 In essence and in practice,
it requires that the government "not prefer one religion to another, or
religion to irreligion.....5 The main thrust is that government neutrality
towards religion is critical, both in action and in appearance.
While the Court has announced various tests for Establishment
Clause violations,"6 these tests are regularly criticized."' Recent
jurisprudence has shown "that the Establishment Clause... cannot
easily be reduced to a single test."''"8 These cases generally require factspecific inquiries that "focus on specific features of a particular
government action to ensure that it does not violate the Constitution."" 9
Despite the difficulty in applying a single test, the basic dangers against
which the Establishment Clause protects have survived the test of time:

iii. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. See cases cited supra note 19.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
II 5 . Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 687 (994).
116. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114-15 (2ool); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (I971).
117. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726-27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
I18. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 720.
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852 (995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity."
The first two of these dangers are significant issues with regard to a
limited public forum. The Court has held that granting equal access to
religious groups in the after-school setting comes close to, but does not
quite run afoul of, the sponsorship danger."2 ' In those cases the fear is
that children will believe that the school is sponsoring the religious
group.' That fear, however, is abated in part by the fact that the
religious group is not using the school facilities during school hours.' 3
The situation is very different, however, when the facts are closer to
those of Faith Center Church, in which the forum is a library, during its
open hours, and the activity is worship.
In the Faith Center Church scenario, the danger of sponsorship,
while not a definitive violation, is more prevalent than in the after-school
scenario. The religious group sought to use the library meeting rooms
during hours in which the library was open to the public.' 4 In this
situation, it is more plausible than the closed school classroom scenario,
that the reasonable observer would view this as state sponsorship of
religion.
There is, of course, the serious possibility that the sponsorship
danger will only grow if the Court declines to find the issue of worship
justiciable. It is very easy to imagine that a municipality might open up its
city hall as a limited public forum. If there is no ability for the courts to
distinguish worship from other religious speech, then a religious
organization will be able to hold worship services in a city hall. The
argument for state sponsorship of religion is much stronger when
inherently religious activities take place in the central building of
municipal government.
A far greater danger than sponsorship is the potential for providing
direct financial support for the inherently religious activities of a
religious group. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia illustrates the limits of financial support that the state can
provide a religious group without violating the Establishment Clause.'25
"This case lies at the intersection of the principle of government

i2o. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (970).
121. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at i15; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
5o8 U.S. 384,395 (1993).
122. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
123. See cases cited supra note 122.
124. Faith Ctr. Church v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194, 1599 (9th Cir. 2006).
125. 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). This case was decided five to four, so it is
crucial that O'Connor saw it as on the edge of violating the Establishment Clause. If the mitigating
factors discussed were not present, it is plausible that the Court would have found a violation.
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' 6
neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities. ,2
The Court held that when a state university paid for the printing of
pamphlets for student groups generally, that it also had to pay for the
printing for a religious group; not to do so would be unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination.'2 7 For Justice O'Connor, the bigger issue was
the potential violation of the Establishment Clause, not viewpoint

discrimination. "s

The sponsorship issue was not the problem here, for the university
required that on each pamphlet the student organization state explicitly
that the organization is independent from the university.' 9 Financial
support for religious activity was the more prevalent danger. Specifically,
this principal of not providing financial support means that "[n]o tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions.., to teach or practice religion.""'3 By paying for
the printing of the materials of a religious group, the university
approached the threshold of an Establishment Clause violation. The
university, however, did not cross that threshold for two reasons. First,
the funds did not pass through the religious organization's hands, but
were paid directly to the vendor, ensuring its use for a permissible
purpose.'3 ' Secondly, while it was not definitive, there was at least the
possibility that a student who objected to the particular use of the funds
could opt out of the payment.'32
The factors that alleviated Justice O'Connor's concerns in
Rosenberger are not present in the Faith Center Church scenario. A
library is a public facility, paid for by the taxpayers. A citizen could not
opt out of paying taxes because he or she did not approve of worship
services that were held in the meeting rooms of the public library.
Moreover, if the courts had no ability to distinguish worship from
permissible forms of religious speech, then there is not the same
guarantee that the funds would be used for permissible purposes, as
there were when the vendor was paid directly. Access to the forum
would be given directly to the religious organization with no way to
ensure that it was used for permissible purposes. If the library could be
used as a house of worship, the state would be paying for a religious
group to conduct inherently religious activities, a clear violation of the
Establishment Clause.'33

126.
127.
128.
129.
13o.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
See id. at 837 (majority opinion).
Id. at 846-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 849.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 16 (1947).

Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 850 (O'Connor. J., concurring).
Id. at 85I.

Id. at 847 (noting there is "no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious
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This last point identifies one more potential Establishment Clause
violation, one which directly implicates the government favoring religion
over irreligion. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in Faith Center Church, a
restriction on worship in a limited public forum is viewpoint neutral, and
constitutional. At issue is whether the courts can enforce a valid
restriction on worship. If the courts cannot, the government will, in
essence, be giving preference to religion over irreligion, a violation of the
Establishment Clause. For every nonreligious group whose manner of
speech is thereby proscribable in a limited public forum, the courts can
and do review the activities in question to see if they run afoul of an
otherwise valid restriction.' " But for the religious organizations, the
courts would have to say that while the restriction on worship is valid, it
cannot review the activities. It would have to adopt rule of "compulsory
deference," which the Court in Jones explicitly held that the First
Amendment does not require. ' No other group is granted this amazing
level of deference. Granting this kind of preferential treatment to
religion is exactly what Establishment Clause warns against." 6
III.

THE WORSHIP TEST

The ability to distinguish between religious worship and other
religious speech rests squarely within the power of the courts, and the
Establishment Clause in fact dictates that the courts must assert their
authority and balance the religion clauses in the context of the limited
public forum.'37 The most difficult challenge for finding the appropriate
method to distinguish worship from other religious speech is to remain
neutral between religions, as well as between religion generally and
secularism.
In the limited public forum, however, the basic structure of the
proposed test is defined, and much of the balancing is predetermined by
neutral principles of law. Specifically, the range in which the Court must
rule is narrowed by the law regarding permissible restrictions on speech
within the limited public forum. Restrictions on speech, religious or
otherwise, are permissible so long as they are reasonable in light of the
purposes of the forum and do not discriminate based upon viewpoint
when the subject is otherwise permissible., 8 The restrictions do not need
activities"); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 642 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Public funds
may not be used to endorse the religious message.").
134. See, e.g., Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 811 (9 th Cir. 2003); Goulart v. Meadows,
345 F.3d 239, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2003).
135. 443 U.S. 595,605 (1979).
I36. Tebbe, supra note 3,at 1310 ("The point is not that excluding worship is required by the
Establishment Clause, but only that antiestablishment considerations may provide reasons to think
that officials should be constitutionally permitted to deny aid to worship as such.").
i37. See text accompanying supra notes 133-35.
538. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 8o6 (985).
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to be the most reasonable restriction, however, just reasonable in light of
the forum.'39 This is a key point, for it dictates that an organization does
not necessarily get to express its viewpoint in the manner of its choice, so
long as it is able to express its viewpoint.'4 ° The manner of expression is
distinct from the viewpoint of the message.
Keeping the foregoing principles in mind, this Note proposes a twopart test to determine if a restriction on a religious organization's use of a
limited public forum is viewpoint neutral, and hence, constitutional. As
with any test, occasional problems will arise in application. As was stated
in Jones, however, the promise of nonentanglement and government
neutrality should result in a decrease in problems as the various parties
learn to "'structure relationships . . . so as not to require the civil courts
to resolve ecclesiastical questions. 13041
Part one of the proposed test is straightforward and essentially
mirrors the general law regarding restrictions on speech in the limited
public forum. A court should first ask if the proposed restriction on
religious speech is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the
purpose of the forum. The burden will be on the forum to prove that the
religious organization is indeed permitted to express its viewpoint, or
that the subject matter in question is not otherwise permissible. A
restriction on worship and nothing more, is viewpoint neutral and
enforceable. 42 If, however, the restriction is broader, a court might find it
unconstitutionally broad and unenforceable, no matter what the religious
activities are at issue. Consistent with other areas of free speech
jurisprudence, even if the activities are otherwise restrictable, an overly
broad restriction is facially
invalid and is not enforceable against a
143
constitutional challenge.
For the second prong of the test, the Court must deviate slightly
from its typical limited public forum analysis, specifically to avoid having
to interpret religious doctrine.'" At the same time the Court must
recognize that for the sake of the Establishment Clause the valid
restriction must be enforceable.' 45 For these reasons, the second prong of
the proposed test constitutes an abuse of discretion standard. It is a
recognition that some activity is open to multiple legitimate
interpretations.4 6 It is not the role of the courts to define worship
139. Id. at 808.
140. Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 8i1( 9 th Cir. 2003). The candidate was allowed to
express his viewpoint in the forum. Id. at 816. However, he was not always allowed to express his
viewpoint in the manner which he preferred: by attacking his opponent's record. Id. at 8I i.
141. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,604 (1979) (citation omitted).
142. See Faith Ctr. Church v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194, 1214 (9th Cir. 2006).
543. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975).
144. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 45I (5969).
145. See discussion supra Part II.A.
146. This is very similar to how the Court has handled the analysis of other areas of law in which a
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specifically. The question that must be asked is whether or not the local
official abused his or her discretion in determining that the activity was
or was not worship.
There are a number of constitutional reasons why an abuse of
discretion standard offers the best method for limiting government
entanglement with religion. An abuse of discretion standard will leave
the decision-making power in the hands of a local official, who is more
likely to know and reflect the will of the community than a judge who is
appointed for life. This community standard is important, for the Court
has previously turned to the community to define difficult principles of
speech, where interpretations varied across the country.'47 Furthermore,
the abuse of discretion standard leaves the decision making in the hands
of someone who must answer to the community. If that official is not in
line with the community standard, that official, as opposed to a judge,
can be voted out of office. This local legislative discretion places the
proposed test within the "legislative primacy" pattern of Court decisions
which attempt to balance the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses."4
In the spectrum of religious activities at issue, on one end is the pure
worship service, on the other is speech about religion, devoid of any
worship. The former, of course, is restrictable in the limited public
forum, while the latter is clearly permissible. As this range is narrowed, it
is easier for the municipality and the religious organizations to structure
their agreements regarding permissible use. An abuse of discretion
standard will encourage discussion and negotiation between the parties.
This will limit the entanglement between the courts and religious groups,
as the courts will only have to intervene in the extreme cases. This is in
stark contrast to the current excessive entanglement, as reflected by the
Bronx Household of Faith series of cases in which the parties litigated the
regulation of the same activity three separate times over ten years, and
the potential for further litigation remains."'

given set of facts is open to multiple interpretations. There is not a right or wrong answer, as the facts
are open to multiple legitimate interpretations. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
142 (I999) ("Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to
determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." (emphasis
omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,31-32 (1973) (applying the community standard as a
basis for addressing difficult free speech questions that might vary from person to person, or state to
state); accord Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974).
148. Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGs L.J. I, 13-14 (2005) ("The
legislative primacy pattern accommodates legislative discretion .... This approach largely leaves to
legislative judgment how many exemptions from generally applicable conduct regulations, if any, will
be afforded to religious adherents and how much assistance, if any, government will provide to
religious institutions in the course of seeking to achieve legitimate secular objectives.").
149. See cases cited supra note 19.
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As recent cases have held, the mere presence of elements of worship
does not make religious speech impermissible per se. As Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Good News Club articulated, in order for a religious
organization to provide support for the general theme which is conveyed,
it must be permitted to quote scripture.'50 Prayer, song, hymns, Bible
lessons, all of these activities, if encompassed within an otherwise
permissible lesson, are similarly allowed. As religious organizations have
conceded, however, there are aspects of a worship service that do not
necessarily carry over to religious speech.'5 '
A good starting point for a local official would be the general nature
of the activity in question. The distinction that the Court approved in
Locke v. Davey is again instructive.'52 Is the purpose of the activity to
express one's devotion to a deity? Or, is the purpose to learn about the
religion and how it might impact one's life? The application for use of
the facility should be a good source of information. If there is a clearly
permissible topic for the session, such as child rearing, or how to deal
with a societal problem, such as homelessness, from the religious
perspective, that is a good sign that the requested use is permissible.
Similarly, if there is a panel discussion, or a question and answer session,
these are good indicators that this is not a worship service.
Conversely, if the session consists solely of elements of a worship
service, with a speech resembling a sermon as the highlight, it might be
rational for a municipal official to consider this worship. The rationality
of this decision could be strengthened if the same religious group seeks
to use the facility on a regular basis for activities which are substantially
the same. This is particularly so if the only aspect which changes is the
topic of the speech or sermon. It would be appropriate for this official to
attend the group's official worship service at the local church. The closer
the activity at the library is to the ritualized, institutionalized service that
takes place at the church, synagogue, or mosque, the more rational it is
to consider it worship. Also, if the organization does not have a local
house of worship, and seeks to use the limited public forum as its de
facto house of worship, that is a factor in favor of determining that the
activity in question is worship.
Not only will the guidelines above narrow the range of
determination in the hands of a local official, ideally they will force the
official and the religious organization to sit down and negotiate an
acceptable solution. With clearly defined areas of permissible activity
and activity that may be restricted, it is far easier for the two sides to

150. Good News Club v. Milford 533 U.S. 98, 125 (2OOt) (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. See supra text accompanying note 58.
152. 540 U.S. 7t2 (2004); see also supra note 7o and accompanying text.
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reach agreement and structure their relationships so as to keep these
disputes out of the courts.
Of course, it is not possible to completely eliminate the range of
determinations by local officials, and there will still be disputes, or upset
members of the community, on either side. This is why it is important to
keep the second prong as an abuse of discretion standard. There will be
situations in which it would be rational for the local official to consider a
given activity to be worship, or to consider it permissible religious
speech. If the community is not pleased with the determinations of the
local official, the community could express their displeasure at the ballot
box and again keep the disputes out of the courts.
The controversy that has caused the courts the most difficulty in
recent years is that of the Bronx Household of Faith series of cases.' 53 A
close examination reveals that the two-prong test proposed above holds
up very well when faced with facts such as those. The proposed test
would reach the same conclusions as the Second Circuit without the
interpretation of religious doctrine and without the excessive
entanglement that has already occurred. For purposes of this
examination, it is not necessary to start at Bronx I, as that was decided
prior to Good News Club.
In Bronx II, the restriction in question excluded both "religious
services [and] religious instruction." ' 54 Under the first prong of the

proposed test, this restriction would be invalid on its face. It is overly
broad, and the courts could prevent its enforcement without having to
address whether or not the organization's activities were worship or not.
In Bronx III, what had changed was the restriction at issue. The New
York City Board of Education revised the restriction to prohibit only
"religious worship services" in the school facilities, or use of a school as
55
"house of worship" in any manner.'
This restriction would pass the first prong of the proposed test, but
the bigger hurdle is the second prong. Did the Board of Education, when
it alerted the Bronx Household of Faith that it would not permit its
activities under the revised restriction, abuse its discretion by concluding
that the activity in question was a worship service? While the Second
Circuit's opinion, which merely vacated the injunction, does not give an
absolute answer as to this question, there are some very good indications
that it did not. Judge Calabresi went through the activities in detail and
had no problem concluding that they were indeed worship services,

153. See cases cited supra note 19.
154. Bronx 11,
331 F-3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
155. Bronx 111,
492 F-3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2007).
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distinguishable from permissible activities of Good News Club, even
though some of the same elements were present.' 6
The second prong would almost certainly reach the same result,
without having to do a rigorous judicial analysis of the group's activities.
The general theme of the religious group's use had gone far enough to
reach into the gray area in which it would be rational for someone to
consider it worship, or to consider it permissible religious speech.'57
Because the activities were in that gray area, it was not an abuse of
discretion to consider it worship. With the proposed test, the courts
would not have to delve as far into religious determinations as is
currently necessary. If the community did not approve of the Board of
Education's determination, the community has the ability to vote in a
new Board of Education, one that would interpret the valid restriction
differently and allow Bronx Household of Faith's activities.
The proposed test also holds up when analyzed against facts similar
to that of Lamb's Chapel.'" The restriction prohibited religious purposes
and was challenged by a religious group seeking to show a religious video
series on child rearing.'59 Under the proposed test, the restriction is
facially invalid as viewpoint discrimination, the same result as reached by
the Court.' 6" Importantly, if one assumes that the school revised the
restriction to the viewpoint neutral prohibition on religious worship, the
proposed test still works. This restriction would pass the first prong,
however, it would not pass the second prong. A video series on child
rearing from the religious perspective is in no way a worship service. It
does not fall into that gray area in which it is rational for an official to
deem it worship. If a local official tried to prohibit the video series, it
would be a clear abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

As with all potential conflicts between the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, a court must be careful not to inhibit the free exercise
of religion, while at the same time showing no preference for religion
over secularism, and no preference for one religion over others. In the
case of the limited public forum, this balancing act is made somewhat
easier by neutral principles of law: namely, that speech can be restricted
so long as it is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. A restriction on
worship, so long as it allows for the religious viewpoint to be expressed in
other methods, is permissible. It is only a restriction on the manner in

156. Id. at 102-03.
157. Id.
158. 508 U.S. 384,387 (1993).
159. Id. at 388-89.
I6o. Id. at 393-94.
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which a religious organization may express its viewpoint; and restrictions
on manner are constitutional and valid.
What had been left unanswered so far is what the appropriate
method for the courts to enforce these restrictions is. The two-part test
suggested by this Note proposes an answer to this question. The first
prong ensures that the free exercise of religion is not inhibited by an
unconstitutionally broad restriction, while the second prong gives effect
to the Establishment Clause without forcing the courts to define worship.
The test allows for legislative discretion at the local level of government,
so that the enforcement of any potential restriction best reflects the will
of the community.
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